University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Honors Theses, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Honors Program

Spring 2020

Institutional Form and its Influence on Instability Following the
Assassination of a Head of State
Ashlee McGill
University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/honorstheses
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons

McGill, Ashlee, "Institutional Form and its Influence on Instability Following the Assassination of a Head of
State" (2020). Honors Theses, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 215.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/honorstheses/215

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses, University of Nebraska-Lincoln by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Institutional Form and its Influence on Instability
Following the Assassination of a Head of State

An Undergraduate Honors Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
University Honors Program Requirements
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

By
Ashlee M. McGill, BA
Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences

March 19, 2020

Robert Schub, Ph.D., Department of Political Science

Abstract
The period following an assassination is one of fear and uncertainty for citizens of a
nation after their leader has been assassinated. However, different nations experience
assassinations differently; while some collapse and result in failed states, other nations have seen
leaders rise to power. Thus, I examine how institutional forms—democracy, autocracy, and
anocracy—influence and structure how a country experiences instability following the
assassination of a head of state. I do this through a qualitative case study of three assassinations:
John F. Kennedy of the United States in 1963; Rafael Trujillo of the Dominica Republic in 1961;
and José Antonio “Chichi” Remón of Panama in 1955. The results show that although
institutional form may structure how states experience instability and the assassination, they do
not determine the final outcomes.
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INTRO
For decades, assassinations have been viewed as a dishonorable tactic by many of the
larger powers in the modern world, and thus fell out of use. However, as the world has changed
and modernized, so too has the nature of warfare changed with it. Assassinations have again
become tools of foreign policy in a world where conventional battles have grown unwieldly
(Shinkman, 2014; Weigant, 2011). Originally, assassination fell out of use because large
standing armies were becoming the key show of strength and ability; honor and integrity were
elevated in status, thus pushing subterfuge—not easily be mitigated by this strength—out of the
sphere of regularly-used tactics by the biggest players (Thomas, 2000). Wars were then fought
with standing armies on chosen battlefields for centuries. However, this idea of warfare changed
with the World Wars, when chemical weapons and explosives began being used en masse,
resulting in some of the highest death tolls in modern history. Nowadays, the image of warfare
has changed drastically: battles are no longer fought with large armies on chosen fields, but with
remote technology and small, elite squads (Morris, 2017; Brown, 2019; Jennings, Fox, &
Talieferro, 2018; Hoffmann, 2009). With this change, assassinations are again becoming a usable
tool, especially in conflicts against insurgent and guerrilla groups who use unconventional
tactics.
While pushed out of use for official state actions, assassination has remained a tactic used
by many non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or insurgency movements. Both heads of state
and political figures have been targeted with both successes and failures. Recently, it has also
come back as a tactic for nations, under various names and in conjunction with other strategies.
However, although assassinations and their effects have been studied in aggregate or alone by
various researchers, there have been no small-n case studies; thus, although the aggregate effects
have been examined, there is little to no research on how various factors can alter the
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ramifications of assassinations within a nation on a smaller scale. Thus, whether these aggregate
effects of assassination actually occur has not been observed. Even more neglected is how a
government’s institutional form influences how the nation reacts to the event of an assassination.
How much does a government’s institutional form influence the instability experienced by the
nation following an assassination?
Although assassinations can expand beyond heads of state to major political figures and
movement leaders, in this paper I focus exclusively on the assassination of heads of state. A head
of state’s place in government, as well as the power they wield, makes them influential figures in
the everyday happenings of a nation. Thus, they would be more likely to cause instability in
multiple domains. Additionally, the head of state often holds more or less power based on the
type of government; for example, separation of powers in a democratic state gives the president
or prime minister less power than an autocratic leader, who can wield the majority of the power.
In this study, I explore how assassinations influence the instability within a nation
following an assassination of a head of state, defined as the representative of the state and head
of government, and how the type of institution—whether democracy, personalist autocracy, or
somewhere in between—affects that influence. I explore the presence of three key characteristics
and their influence on the stability a nation experiences: the presence of an order of succession,
the norms surrounding that order of succession, and separation of powers in the government. As
these traits are typically present in a democracy, and help to mitigate the instability caused by an
assassination, I expect that nations with democratic institutions would experience little instability
caused by the assassination, while nations lacking such characteristics, such as autocracies,
would experience more instability. This could be for various reasons. The order of succession,
for example, has multiple effects: It prevents uncertainty within the general population and the
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political elites, which can help economic stability, as well as preventing a power vacuum that
could lead to violence between warring factions. Separation of powers, on the other hand, has the
main effect that policies do not change drastically from leader to leader because lawmaking
power or judicial power rests with a separate political entity. Each characteristic is explored in
each case to observe differences between institution types in an attempt to test whether
institutional influences do alter how a nation experiences instability following an assassination.
In line with this, the cases observed are the John F. Kennedy assassination in the United
States in 1963, the assassination of Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic in 1961, and José
Antonio “Chichi” Remón of Panama in 1955. The U.S. is a 200-year old democracy and has
been working since the 1950s to spread democracy around the world, while the Dominican
Republic was one of the world’s longest-running dictatorships under Trujillo. Panama falls
between the two states, considered to be an “anocracy” for the purposes of this paper. This is
explored more in-depth in the methodology section.
I find that, in a broad view, the type of institution can affect the level of instability in a
nation following an assassination. The United States experienced minimal instability following
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, with each characteristic having a role to play in
the aftermath. The Dominican Republic and Panama—which, while an anocracy, leaned more
autocratic—both experienced higher levels of instability. However, in researching the Dominican
Republic, it’s become clear that it is a bit of an outlier case, as many of the effects that were
expected—such as a power vacuum or clashing factions—either did not manifest or were shut
down quickly, before any real effects could be seen. Considering the aggregate results of
assassinations, it is very possible that the Dominican Republic is an outlier, rather than a
representative case.
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From this study, numerous other questions have been spawned, which are explored more
in the conclusion. Overall, however, my theory supports my original hypothesis: states that have
democratic characteristics experience less instability following an assassination when compared
to autocratic or anocratic regimes due to those characteristics mitigating instability.
The rest of this thesis will proceed as follows. The next section includes a literature
review of relevant studies regarding the effects of assassinations in aggregate, as well as main
causes of assassination and some additional factors that can increase instability within
autocracies, unrelated to post-assassination influences. After that follows the research design
section, outlining how and why the three cases were selected. Following that is the case studies
themselves, and a final concluding paragraph outlining the findings and other questions that have
become apparent in the course of this research.
LIT REVIEW
As used in this paper, “assassination” is defined as an intentional killing of a
political figure by an individual or group; for the purpose of this study, I focus only on
assassinations of a head of state, the representative figure of the state. Instability in each
individual category is defined as such in this section, pulling from various authors. I loosely
define the institutions observed in this study. Because various regimes can vary so much under
singular label, a narrow definition would exclude some other regimes which, logically, would fit
under that label.
Thus, I define democracy as a nation that has a “free and fair” election, driven by the
voting of citizens. Additionally, a democratic society has some mechanism for separating
powers, so that the powers of government are not consolidated in a singular branch. Generally,
these states have a Polity IV data set score above 6. Autocracies, on the other hand, are
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characterized as a nation where citizens have little to no say in the political outcomes of the
nation. Despite the stereotype, I am not requiring power to be consolidated in the hands of one
person; for example, China does not allow its citizens input in the political actions of the country,
but power is consolidated in a party, rather than a singular figure, such as Xi Jinping. Thus,
power is consolidated in a singular group, even if that group is large. These states typically have
scores below -6 in the Polity IV data set. Anocracies are defined as those laying between -6 and
6; the aspects of the government may vary between democratic and autocratic characteristics.
I seek to limit my observation to the one-to-three month period following an
assassination, as well as clearly-connected long term events, and the instability occurring
because of the assassination in three domains: political, social, and economic. Because each case
study involves an assassination, the possibility of increased instability being a result of prior
instability is not a confounding factor in these cases. Prior research in the area has always
gathered as many cases as possible and observed the aggregate effects of assassination,
according to a large-n study. I seek to limit my study to three distinct cases to observe the
influence that institutions have: whether a democratic state experiences less instability than an
autocratic regime, and how a nation that lies somewhere between them is affected.
Causes of Assassinations
Assassinations can be carried out for a variety of purposes. They could be utilized to
remove an elite from power, to incite a systemic or ideological change, or to propagandize a
position. An assassination may be employed by a political opponent to eliminate some
competition; on the other hand, it could be a label applied to the murder of a political figure by
someone who is mentally deranged and had no politically motivated intent (Kirkham, Levy, &
Crotty, 1969). These motivations that underly assassinations can vary based on the government
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institution: authoritarian nations, for example, likely see more assassinations focusing on
systemic or ideological change or government use to suppress challengers, especially in a more
personalist regime. In a democracy, assassinations are more likely to be used to terrorize the
population and weaken institutional norms. These differing motivations are what predispose
authoritarian governments to more assassinations—because the “payoff” is higher, assassinations
can be seen as an efficient method of achieving an individual or group’s goals in an autocracy.
These differing motivations also give rise to a vital point that can affect the final
outcomes noted here: Because assassination in authoritarian governments is often utilized as a
way of changing rulers or administrations, they are often paired with coups, which come with
their own range of factors that contribute to instability. In this paper, I attempt to isolate
assassinations from coups; as implied here, this means that the conclusions reached here are not
necessarily universally applicable regarding authoritarian assassinations unless they are separate
from a coup d’état.
Effects of Assassination on Political Stability
Political instability has been a term that researchers have been trying to define for
decades, with limited success due to our ever-changing understanding of what instability looks
like and how different events influence governments. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I
utilize Jong-A-Pin’s (2009) definition, comprising four categories: politically motivated
violence, mass civil protest, instability within the political regime, and instability of the political
regime. The former two factors reside with the general population and depend on their
sentiments towards the administration in power and, in the case of protests, do not necessarily
need to involve violence. The difference between the latter categories centers around whether the
political regime is polarizing and fractioning or experiencing a change in leadership or

INSTITUTION EFFECT ON INSTABILITY AFTER ASSASSINATION 7
constitution. Based on these categories, the effects of assassination on political instability can
vary based on the type of political institutions and the position held by the target.
A key factor in the latter two categories is the type of regime in which the target is
placed. A successful assassination of a sitting head of state in an authoritarian nation is more
likely to lead to both a transition to democracy and an institutional change in leadership (Jones &
Olken, 2009). However, there is substantial variation between authoritarian regimes. Geddes’
2014 data set classifying authoritarian regimes lists four types: military regimes, single-party
regimes, personalist regimes, or hybrid regimes. The stereotypical authoritarian nation, with
power consolidated into one person or elite group, is defined as a personalist regime, and the
kind I am examining here. These regimes typically have smaller, elite groups, dependent on the
leader for their own political survival, and thus are unlikely to work against them (Weeks, 2008).
Personalist authoritarian nations are at an increased risk of instability following an
assassination. This increased risk of instability is due to a dictator’s position as the cornerstone of
his regime. In an intrastate conflict, value may be placed on the office or position that opens up,
especially in situations where the order of succession is unclear (Bruce, 2013; Iqbal & Zorn,
2008). For a coveted office, such as that of the head of state, numerous regime changes can lead
to instability through inconsistent policies and legitimacy issues, which then creates further
issues for the successor, no matter their role in the power transition (Mazrui, 1968; Thyne,
Powell, Parrott, & VanMeter, 2018). This illegitimacy can manifest as a loss of international
support, such as revocation of aid and placement of economic sanctions, or a loss in domestic
support.
Personalist authoritarian regimes, however, do have a method of quelling this instability
if the leader controls the security apparatus in the country—whether that be an army, police
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force, or other group—and is the main road to higher office within the state. Under these two
conditions, leaders have a near-monopoly on access to violence and can quell rebellions with
little to no risk to their own status. Because the elite of the state rely on the leader for their own
success, they’re unlikely to challenge them in a way that would lead to the ousting of the leader.
The presence of an order of succession can, as implied above, have major effects. Based
on the presence or lack of an order of succession, political violence surrounding the selection of
a new leader is possible. Authoritarian regimes are so often vulnerable to assassination because
of the lack of a clear succession, opening the door to anyone with an arguable claim and the
political or physical power to back it up (Perliger, 2015; Iqbal & Zorn, 2008). On the flip side, in
a democracy, controversy surrounding an election could damage the legitimacy of the new
leader. Polarized populations and dubious succession can lead to increased violence and future
assassinations as well (Perliger, 2015), trapping states in a cycle of new and failing leaders.
Similarly, the ability of a government to refocus to some degree on the citizens’ well-being and
appear as a functioning institution can influence the risk of conflict recurrence and future
stability (Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Fearon, 2011; Hegre and Nygärd, 2015).
Effects of Assassination on Social Stability
Social instability, like political instability, is an ever-changing term that scholars struggle
to consistently pin down. Unlike the socially-driven aspects of political stability defined by JongA-Pin above, social instability tends to be removed from politics, and centers more around
quality of life, as is measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). Thus, I will be using the
definition utilized in Sengupta’s 2005 article:
At a more concrete level, social stability is about the condition of freedom from social
disorder which is generally manifested in the form of inter-group conflict and violence. It
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is also the condition of sustainable development and well-being which, in specific terms,
would mean a society without poverty, hunger, exploitation, suicide, corruption, violence
and other crimes. (Sengupta, 2005, pp. 5103)
By this definition, although social instability and political instability are defined differently, they
can have some overlap and potentially increase the other; for example, high levels of poverty,
hunger, and crime can lead a population to begin mass protests or politically-motivated violence
in an attempt to force the person they deem responsible out of office.
Assassinations, by this definition, thus have few pronounced effects. The key influence is
that small scale conflicts can be exacerbated, while large-scale conflicts can be calmed (Jones &
Olken, 2009); violence could escalate or decrease based on group reactions (Hafez & Hatfield,
2006). The perception of the general public can greatly influence what the response is to an
assassination, allowing it to have a ripple effect. Some may celebrate while others mourn, and
domestic hostility to a new leader can cut their tenure short (Thyne et al., 2018). Thus, if a small
faction revolts against the leader, this singular conflict can cause clashes with either other
factions of the population or with the military, which increases social instability in the form of
potential food shortages, violence, and general disorder within the state.
In another vein, some leader may engage in exploitative practices that can drive the
country into the ground by prioritizing bigger short-term gains over long-term development
(Bates, 2008). Just as how exploitive colonization resulted in depressed economic growth and
centralized despotism (Mamdani, 1996), if a leader is more focused on filling his own pockets
over helping his country develop, not only is the nation’s economic development depressed, but
the resulting poverty contributes to social instability by lowering the standard of living.
Effects of Assassination on Economic Stability
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I define economic instability here as a weakening economy, showing signs such as a lack
of growth in GDP, as well as a decrease in foreign and domestic investments. Increases in
unemployment and the percent of the population above the poverty line will also be key figure in
measuring the effects of an assassination on economic well-being.
The difficulty in measuring instability has made correlating economic growth with
political instability an ever-evolving research topic. Older studies were consistently finding
negative and significant correlations between political instability and decreased investment,
which in turn weakens the economy (Gupta, 1990; Barro, 1991; Alesina and Perotti, 1996;
Perotti, 1996; Ades and Chua, 1997). Jong-A-Pin’s 2009 study, trying to more accurately
measure political instability as mentioned above, divided actions into four separate categories:
politically motivated violence, mass civil protest, instability within the political regime, and
instability of the political regime. Of these four, only instability of the regime truly affected the
economy by causing uncertainty about property rights—a key factor in economic growth, as
without property rights, no profit is guaranteed, and citizens are less likely to push for higher
profits. This lack of property rights makes future gains uncertain, which in turn disincentivizes
investors and decreases investment in and to the state.
On the other hand, how foreign states—whether allies, creditors, or trade partners—
respond to a regime born from an assassination can determine how long and how stable that
regime is (Thyne et al. 2018). Sanctions by a foreign power can weaken an economy through
various channels (Bates, 2008; Grauvogel & von Soest, 2014; Jong-A-Pin, 2009); this, in turn,
can result in higher unemployment as profits drop and budgets get tighter. This leads to more
social instability if the government does not step in to mitigate it. Higher levels of political
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instability correlate with a lower GDP, lower investment, and higher rates of inflation, all of
which weaken economies (Aisen & Veiga, 2011).
THEORY
My hypothesis is as follows: Democratic institutions face less instability when compared
with autocratic or anocratic regimes following an assassination because of built-in processes
and mechanisms that assist in mitigating said instability. Such processes and mechanisms give
channels for the instability to be diluted, preventing escalation of tensions.
The first characteristic common in democracy but rare in autocracies is governmental
separation of powers. In the U.S., this takes the form of the legislature and presidency; in others,
it may be a parliament and prime minister or president. In any case, the law-making ability and
law enforcement ability are separated, and no singular person or group holds complete or
preponderant power over the state. Because lawmaking power does not rest with a singular
person, changing leaders does not guarantee a turnaround in the policies of the country. In
contrast, consolidation of power is a key characteristic of a personalist autocracy, and while this
may work well for a time—policies will be implemented rapidly, unlike in democracy—if a
leader is suddenly removed from office, the entire government is without direction, because no
one else holds that power. When a new leader comes in, policy begins working in the direction
they desire, rather than continuing in the same direction. This would result in rapidly changing
social conditions, which may push populations to protest and result in more instability.
The second mechanism that would help to mitigate political instability, as mentioned
above, is the order of succession built into many modern democracies. The purpose of this
process is to ensure that, should the head of state become unable to perform their duties,
someone is designated and able to step in. This can take many different forms: In the U.S., a line
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of succession is enshrined in a constitutional amendment; in Britain, Parliament has protocols for
choosing a new Prime Minister. In almost any democracy in the world, there is some function
that helps to fill the office if a head of state is suddenly removed from office. This prevents a
power vacuum from occurring. Power vacuums, a hole in leadership that does not get filled
quickly, typically result in numerous people or groups fighting for that position or office. These
conflicts can become violent as individual actors attempt to claim the power of the open position
or office, which can cause violent clashes among citizens who join factions. Preventing the
power vacuum by way of an order of succession, naming a successor before the loss of the
current leader, means less violence and instability, as the competition for the role is still
constrained to the regular elections.
A final, major factor in why democracies would experience the instability from an
assassination differently than an autocracy or anocracy is the social norms that surround the
order of succession and the legitimacy stemming from this. A leader who comes to power
through an accepted process has far more legitimacy than a ruler who forcefully takes power in a
democracy. In many autocracies, without support from both internal and external actors, the time
horizon for a newly-installed leader shortens when compared to a leader who enjoys such
support (Thyne et al., 2018). Thus, in the first place, there is a strong deterrent to a key motivator
for assassinations in democratic, but not autocratic, institutions: to begin a coup d’etat to put a
new leader in power. These norms also assist in preventing the power vacuum, as anyone who
tried to take power following an assassination would struggle to keep hold between the pressure
from the government and the pressure from citizens.
There are also some mechanisms and norms that work prior to an assassination that can
help prevent them. These differences result in democracies naturally experiencing fewer
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assassinations than autocracies. This is likely because the order of succession built into many
democracies; while it can work to help stabilize a nation following such an event, an order of
succession also deters attempts to seize governmental power by force. It certainly lowers the
expected benefit or “payoff” of an assassination in a democratic nation. Meanwhile, in an
autocracy, a successful assassination could lead to seizing of power therefore gaining a huge
benefit. Theses difference make the initial act of an assassination much rarer in democracies, and
combined with other mechanisms of democratic institutions, it can prevent some of the
instability seen prior to an assassination by allowing non-violent methods of expression and
alternative forms of removing those in power.
In conjunction with this, democratic institutions give citizens nonviolent outlets to
address grievances with the government, such as freedom to assemble and petition the
government and the electoral system to remove political representatives from power. By giving
an outlet for grievances, collective actions are less likely to become rebellions that require
violence or overthrow to enact change, instead pressuring political figures into either stepping
down or conforming to public desires. So long as the protest remains peaceful, a violent
intervention by the government is strongly deterred by the chance of losing public offices, either
through the general public or by legal processes. In an autocracy, a collective movement that
could be seen as a threat and would thus be squashed; with no conventional mechanisms to
remove an unwanted leader from power, assassinations remove the leader from power and can
open the door to another leader. Whether that leader shares the same fate depends on how the
next administration and their policies.
RESEARCH DESIGN
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In this paper, I employ a qualitative case study design, examining how the expected
effects outlined above affect three different states following an assassination: the United States
following John F. Kennedy’s assassination, the Dominican Republic following Rafael Trujillo’s
assassination, and Panama following Remón’s assassination. In selecting these cases, I went for
diverse cases as defined by Seawright & Gerring (2008), focusing on maintaining the presence of
a stand-alone assassination (i.e. with no connected successful coup) and choosing different types
of institutions as key independent variables.
In choosing the institutional basis for these nations, there are three levels of polity that the
chosen governments fit into: democracy, autocracy, and anocracy, a hybrid regime that has
elements of both democracy and autocracy. I base these categorizations on the Polity IV Project
dataset; the states are defined as democracy if the score is 6 or above, anocracy if the score is
between 5 and -5, and autocracy if the score is -6 or below (Marshall, 2014).
Data for analyzing the political and social stability is drawn from national news sources,
such as newspaper articles or media, as well as scholarly sources for historic events. Economic
data will be drawn from sources such as the World Bank or government reports for such
measures as GDP, investment, and unemployment, as well as independent sources on the state at
the time of the assassination.
United States
With a score of 10 and a history as the “shining example” of democracy, the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 is the case I chose for observing the effects of
assassination on a democracy. It has been given a polity score of 10 since 1946. With the
legislative branch separated from the executive branch, the loss of a head of state does not
greatly affect the lawmaking process, so policy is highly unlikely to suddenly change directions,
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theoretically mitigating some political instability that would result from a change in leadership.
Similarly, the distinction of a line of succession meant that a transfer of power happened rapidly,
preventing the nation from being without a leader for an extended period of time.
Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic, prior to 1961 when Rafael Trujillo was assassinated, received a
polity score of -9. As an authoritarian nation with a stand-alone assassination—a rare
occurrence—the Dominican Republic was my chosen autocratic assassination. Although
technically part of a failed coup attempt, the assassination was plotted by a very small group,
rather than a large movement that was capable of seizing power in the aftermath. Thus, I
consider this a good example of a time that the effects of assassination can be separated from the
effects of a coup d’etat in an autocratic state.
Panama
From 1952 to 1955, when José Antonio “Chichi” Remón was president of Panama, the
nation had a polity score of -1; it increased following his assassination to a score of 4. Since their
independence in 1903 from Colombia, the state had an elected parliament. However, while
presidents were elected to four year terms, multiple presidents attempted to lengthen their own
term through amending or suspending the constitution, and at one point, a former president was
arrested for speaking out against the regime. The military also commonly turned on a leader and
bloodlessly removed them, sending the former leader into exile. While not in the 1960s, this is
still within the Cold War era.
CASE 1: UNITED STATES, JOHN F. KENNEDY
In November of 1963, while driving through Dealey Plaza in Dallas, Texas, President
John F. Kennedy was assassinated while the presidential motorcade wound through the plaza.
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The official story from federal investigators is that Lee Harvey Oswald, a former Marine, shot
the president from the Texas School Book Depository with a rifle (Benson, 2002). However,
there were over 200 witnesses with conflicting stories, resulting in numerous controversies
surrounding the assassination.
In a democratic institution such as the U.S., we would expect instability to not increase
following an assassination due to the order of succession, the norms surrounding this succession,
and the separation of powers. As supported by the evidence below, the JFK assassination did not
increase the instability in the U.S. a significant amount, and anything that did change in the U.S.
had reached pre-assassination levels by the new year.
Political Instability
The first characteristic of democracy discussed is the order of succession. Because the
order of succession in the U.S. is laid out in the Constitution, there was no doubt about Lyndon
B. Johnson coming to power following the assassination. This component of democracy
essentially makes any concerns about power struggles a non-issue. Additionally, because there
was less than a 12-hour span between Kennedy’s death in Dallas and Johnson being sworn in,
had there been someone attempting to seize power, the window to do so was extremely short.
These all contributed to a lack of power struggle and related violence in the wake of Kennedy’s
assassination. This characteristic of democracy essentially makes any concerns about power
struggles a non-issue.
Without a question of who, exactly, becomes the next leader, the question then becomes
whether those already in power—namely agency heads with longer tenures such as the FBI or
the Joint Chiefs of Staff—agree with the new president’s policy preferences or oppose them. As
was seen during Kennedy’s tenure, tension between the president and the JCOS caused a rift
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between the president—the second-youngest president ever elected at the time, succeeding the
Great General Dwight D. Eisenhower—and the JCOS. From the beginning, there was a lack of
mutual respect between them that made forging agreements difficult and made Kennedy wary of
the chiefs’ advice (Dallek, 2013). The strife extended to the cabinet secretaries as well. This
resulted in two different rhetorics coming from the government: that of the more restrained
Kennedy administration, trying to avoid a nuclear conflict, and that of the more hawkish Joint
Chiefs, who believed that a nuclear war could be fought and won by the U.S. (Benson, 2002).
Johnson and his civilian cabinet generally advocated for a more peaceful policy in Vietnam,
opposite the joint chiefs’ hawkish policy that sought an expansion of the war. However, in the
months following the assassination, Johnson did not directly escalate the war; it was not until
April 1964 that U.S. air power in the region was supplemented (Brigham, 1998). As this relative
acquiescence did not come until nearly half a year after the assassination, the level of strife likely
held relatively steady as Johnson finished out Kennedy’s term.
The next characteristic discussed is the norms surrounding succession. These norms
prevent instability in the fact that, as the order of succession is codified in both the Constitution
of the United States and a separate act of Congress, there is a legal guarantee of a person who
can succeed the president, should the president become unable to perform his or her duties
(Bombay, 2019). This “designated survivor,” as well as the acts that helped to create the order of
succession, are widely accepted in the U.S. and have decreased the possibility of instability
following the assassination of a president. This process allows for minimal interruption in the
presence of leadership, demonstrated by the mere hours between JFK’s death in Dallas and
Johnson’s swearing in on Air Force One. Because there is a constant display that leadership
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continued, there was no fear that Kennedy’s death would somehow lead to damage to the U.S. or
the government to any degree.
Additionally, a lack of increase of political instability due to the norms surrounding
succession is seen in the lack of fragmentation in the general public. While not everyone agreed
with Johnson’s preferences or proposed legislation, his legitimate claim to the position—coming
into the office by legal and accepted means—meant that people still accepted him as the
president. Thus, there were few protests against Johnson’s presidency, and protests for ongoing
movements—such as the civil rights movement—were not exacerbated by Kennedy’s
assassination. While they did not end after Kennedy’s election, or even after the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Kennedy’s assassination was not directly responsible the exacerbation
of the civil rights movement and did not have any immediate effects.
The final characteristic discussed is the separation of powers. Due to the nature of
democracy, with the president wielding no power to make permanent laws, it is unlikely that the
direction of domestic policy would change drastically, as Congress controls the law-making
process. In this case, the change would be even less drastic: Both Kennedy and Johnson were
Democrats. Their policy leanings were similar domestically, to the point where Johnson
leveraged Kennedy’s legacy of pushing for equality to get the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed through Congress.
Social Instability
The first characteristic, an order of succession, helped to prevent social instability by
ensuring continued leadership of the nation and preventing fissures in the public by having
multiple people competing for the office outside of election campaigns. While the president may
change come the election the next year, immediately following JFK’s death, everyone agreed
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that Johnson would be the new president until the next election. This universal agreement
ensured the Johnson could lead the country without fear of an immediate challenger or riots by
those who disagree with his policies.
In addition, through Kennedy’s legacy and later Johnson’s policy, his actions regarding
the civil rights movement potentially helped to decrease the overall amount of stability in the
long-term. With the civil rights movement continuing to grow and activists becoming bolder, the
movement and tensions surrounding it were escalating since long before Kennedy’s
assassination. This tension was greatest in the Democratic party, as it was split between more
liberal northern Democrats—who wanted to see equal rights put in place—and the segregationist
southern Democrats. When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and later the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, these southern Democrats distanced themselves and moved toward the
Republican party. Thus, the split in the Democrat party faded with their departure, lessening the
divisions in government.
The next characteristic, norms surrounding succession, prevented instability in a similar
way, by preventing violence and divisions. Fissures in the general population caused by multiple
leaders could have contributed to increased violence among the general public by inciting and
encouraging violence. Similar as noted above, however, this did not occur in the U.S. because no
other leaders could step forward. Even if someone had, there would have been little to no support
for whoever it was that stepped forward. The norms prevented these breaks and the violence
associated with them in the United States. If anything, if defined as a “moderate war” by James
and Olken (2006)—a conflict with over 25 and up to 999 battle deaths—it is possible that the
civil rights movement would intensify. However, the civil rights movement largely focused on
nonviolent means of protest, rather than violent methods. Much of the violence seen was
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occurring on the part of white sympathizers or people attempting to protect racist traditions,
rather than the protestors themselves (Belknap, 1984). Perhaps the biggest event was the march
in Birmingham, resulting in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail. This is what
pushed Kennedy to draft civil rights legislation. Following his assassination, there was a big push
for black voter registration; however, this was occurring before his assassination as well, and was
thus not greatly exacerbated by his assassination.
The third characteristic discussed is the separation of powers. Because laws are made
separate from the executive branch and the presidency, Kennedy’s assassination did not result in
the country no longer growing or the government briefly ceasing to function. The direction of
Congress, as well, did not change greatly with Kennedy’s assassination. The president’s role in
lawmaking has two aspects: he can recommend legislation to be brought by a Congress member,
and he has the final say of whether a bill becomes a law through the presidential veto. Thus,
despite the loss of Kennedy—the driving force of many policies at the time—Congress could
continue lawmaking without the chief executive.
Economic Instability
As stated above, the order of succession and the norms surrounding it, as well as the
separation of powers that exists in democracies, prevented instability from increasing in the U.S.
following this election. The economic stability stems from this and is easily spotted by observing
the Treasury yields in 1963 and 1964: U.S. Treasury yields did not change substantially from
before and after Kennedy’s assassination. This indicates that the American public and other
investors were not worried about the government defaulting and ceasing to pay back bonds; had
the rate began to increase, it would have indicated that people were selling back bonds and other
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certificates from the Treasury before the maturity date because they did not trust the government
to continue paying those bonds.
In addition, there was a minimal shift in the unemployment rate. At the end of October,
unemployment was at 5.5% nationally. At the end of November, just over a week after
Kennedy’s assassination, the unemployment rate was at 5.7%; by the end of December, it had
fallen back to 5.5%. While there was a small shift following the assassination, the “spike” had
flattened back out before the year even ended. Thus, similar to the Treasury rate, this is a signal
that the economy remained healthy.
Arguably, this is a result of the United States’ free market economy functioning properly;
while not a traditional interpretation of the separation of powers, it still shows how separating
certain powers from the president helps in guaranteeing the continued health of the country.
Rather than relying on the government to keep it moving forward, whether directly through fiscal
and monetary policy or indirectly by his personal economic stakes, the free markets kept the
country moving and prevented any economic stumbles because of Kennedy’s assassination.
Overall, the democratic institution’s characteristics and norms mitigated potential pathways to
instability following Kennedy’s assassination.
CASE STUDY 2: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, RAFAEL LEONIDAS TRUJILLO
When the Trujillo era began in 1930, the Dominican Republic’s history was a series of
tragedies and wars, topped by repeated control by foreign nations with little care for the outcome
of the Caribbean nation. Trujillo’s regime was “unprecedented” for the amount of control he
exerted over Dominican life due to his control of the military and the loyalty of groups who
influenced the population (Gleijeses, 1978). Whether it be the Catholic church or the
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professional associations, he faced little opposition until later, 25 years into his rule, when Latin
America experienced a wave of democratic sympathy and dictators began being overthrown.
Rather than tone his oppressive rule down and avoid this period of unrest, Trujillo began
picking fights in the region and brought international sanctions on the republic. Alarmed by the
ailing Dominican economy and his lack of regional allies, he tightened his grip on the country
until May 30, 1961, when he was assassinated in a failed coup attempt. Rather than continue to
rule as a dictator, his son and successor Ramfis Trujillo thrust democracy upon the nation in a
bid to lift economic sanctions and was subsequently overthrown in a military coup (Geddes et
al., 2014).
As a personalist autocratic regime, we would expect instability in the Dominican
Republic to increase greatly following an assassination. However, that is not what we see in the
Trujillo regime: rather, the country continued to run rather well, and it was instead the choices of
the succeeding leader, Ramfis Trujillo, more than a year later that lead to increased instability in
the Dominic Republic, perhaps influenced by Rafael Trujillo but without a causal link.
Political Instability
The first characteristic discussed is the order of succession. As the head of an autocratic
nation with only a figurehead elected for a public, Trujillo’s death understandably set off a
scramble for power that was answered by many. During his rule, Trujillo had been cautious to
keep high-ranking officials rotating in and out of their positions, so as to prevent them ever
establishing their own power base (Gleijeses, 1978) and guaranteeing his continued rule. This
rotation ensured no one could challenge him when he was alive and left no one person more
ahead than another in the race for the top after his death without support from his family.
However, the power vacuum was erased quickly by Trujillo’s family by recalling his son,

INSTITUTION EFFECT ON INSTABILITY AFTER ASSASSINATION 23
Ramfis, from Paris to become the new leader of the Dominican Republic behind puppet
president Joaquín Balaguer. Thus, although one would expect to see a power vacuum resulting in
fragmentation and potential political violence, this possibility was quickly eliminated in the
Dominican Republic.
Beyond recalling Ramfis to become the new dictator, Trujillo had also cemented his
family’s place by ensuring that no opposition existed and domestic influencers lacked the
political clout to challenge, cementing his regime as a personalist dictatorship (Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz, 2014). As stated above, Trujillo kept his military chiefs and other high-ranking
commanders rotating, tying their continued success to his family. His control extended beyond
the military: “He dominated not only the political system, the press, the radio, and the fledgling
trade unions, but also… every group able to exert even limited influence on public life”
(Gleijeses, 1978, 22). The Catholic Church, foregoing its role as a potential check the Trujillo
could not gain control over, instead became an accomplice to remain in good standing with the
powerful. Balaguer, resident of the presidential office, had replaced Trujillo’s own brother and
proved himself as loyal to the family, eliminating the risk he could have posed. Thus, even after
Trujillo’s death, any possible challengers from the domestic sphere were under the family’s
influence and subjected to many of the same norms that ordinary citizens were.
The next characteristic discussed is the norms surrounding the order of succession.
Because Trujillo’s successor was his son, the family remained in power. Trujillo had been so
successful at building his regime that, following his death and the announcement by his family
that his son was taking power, no one dared challenge their decision; Balaguer remained a
faithful servant to the regime, the generals linked their own fate to the Trujillo family, and the
mass media sources continued publishing official propaganda (Gleijeses, 1978). The strong ties
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to the family likely prevented any challengers from coming forward and feeling able to do so;
Trujillo had a long history of silencing opponents, and even as Ramfis and Balaguer worked to
remove sanctions from the Organization of American States by democratizing, people did not
feel as though they could safely speak out.
These norms differed greatly from the norms seen in democracies. While Ramfis and
Balaguer may have pushed for opponents and opposition to step forward, the Dominican citizens
had 31 years of living under Trujillo’s regime, where opposition was eliminated and speaking
against him was dangerous. When opposition did finally appear, they were often formerly exiled
opponents of the Trujillo family seeking the destruction of the family. Although the elder
Trujillo was gone, those fears carried over into his son’s tenure as leader despite their different
policies.
Although the decision to bring democracy to the Dominican Republic was Ramfis’
choice, it was clearly influenced by the OAS sanctions, brought upon the nation by Rafael
Trujillo and described as a “yoke only [he] could bear” (Gleijeses, 1978, 32). This year of
democracy, almost immediately following the assassination, could have destabilized the state; as
various opponents began speaking up and were allowed, more and more opposition to the
Trujillo family arose, and opposition kept growing as citizens began exercising this new right.
While this is vital for a democracy—decisions can’t be made without multiple choices—the
Dominican Republic was democratized rapidly, with little cultural transition to accompany the
policy change, and thus resulted in instability as the entire system of government and, thus, way
of life, in the state was altered.
The final characteristic discussed is the separation of powers. Following Trujillo’s death,
Ramfis didn’t continue ruling behind the scenes as his father did, lacking the traits that would

INSTITUTION EFFECT ON INSTABILITY AFTER ASSASSINATION 25
make it possible for him to properly fill his father’s shoes. The Dominican Congress created an
entirely new position just for him, naming him “Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (Gleijeses,
1978). Additionally, as stated above, much of the government tied their own fate to the Trujillo
family; unlike a democracy, the government linked itself to the family. His death spelled the end
of the personalist dictatorship in the Dominican Republic.
Social Instability
The first characteristic discussed is the order of succession. There was no major violence
following Trujillo’s assassination, and this was helped by the fact that the Trujillo family—as
stated above—closed the power vacuum within hours of Rafael Trujillo’s death. Because there
was no guarantee that Ramfis, Rafael Trujillo’s son, would succeed him and that the Trujillo
family would stay in power, a struggle for the positions and wealth that the family controlled was
very possible. However, the vacuum was quickly filled, limiting the violence and the effect on
the citizens.
Perhaps the bigger threat was whether or not this assassination was part of a larger
domestic plot. Assassinations are often part of a larger plot, acting as a focal point around which
a larger rebellion sparks. This did not occur in the Dominican Republic. Although there were
many “rebel groups”, few had the resources or contacts to make any sort of move against Trujillo
(Diederich, 1978). Only around 14 people within Trujillo’s regime were involved in the final act
that successfully launched an attack; it’s been theorized that, in addition to the small group in the
Republic, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was in some way involved with the plot.
However, within the country, the assassination was coordinated by a small, tight-knit group.
Even if many Dominicans wished to see Trujillo assassinated or overthrown, due to his years of
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repressive actions, nobody either dared to act on these feelings or had the means to, which
minimized the violence to those citizens beyond the assassins.
The second characteristic discussed are the norms surrounding the succession. After
Trujillo’s death, despite the changing policies of the Dominican Republic, people still expected
the same practices from the government and the Trujillo family, now headed by Ramfis Trujillo.
While this meant that people’s speech was restricted—despite Ramfis and Balaguer inviting
opposition, no one stepped up for some time—this fear of a crackdown on dissenters or
outspoken opposition also helped to smooth the transition from father to son. The capitol city
was silent, save for the sounds of the national police hunting down the assassins, and no one
dared celebrate the death of the tyrant (Gleijeses, 1978).
Prior to Trujillo’s death, in response to his violations of human rights, the Organization of
American States placed sanctions onto the Dominican Republic. Following the assassination,
Ramfis and Balaguer worked to get these sanctions lifted by democratizing the country. This led
to a spike in the Republic’s polity score in 1961, from -9 to 8 (Marshall, 2014), through their
efforts. While this opportunity was not immediately acted upon, as noted above, the government
was encouraging the people to begin speaking out and civilly opposing the Trujillo regime and
Balaguer’s presidency. Instability later struck in full force when Ramfis and Balaguer went back
on the democratic plan, but this increase in instability is unrelated to Trujillo’s assassination.
The final characteristic discussed is separation of powers. Following Trujillo’s death, the
regime government—such a well-established and oiled machine through his 31 years of rule—
continued to function as it did before his death. Even the Catholic church had supported the
Trujillo family in the Dominican Republic and continued to support the regime following the
assassination. Thus, although Trujillo had a hand over every part of government and refused to
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allow any one person the opportunity to build a power base in the population, the government
was removed enough from his leadership for it to still function without his continued survival.
Additionally, Ramfis and Balaguer created a government coalition during their democratization,
which further separated them from power Trujillo had held during his time as the Dominican
dictator. Thus, following Trujillo’s death, stability courtesy of the separation of powers, contrary
to expectations, actually decreased.
Economic Instability
While building one of the longest-lasting personalist dictatorships in history, Trujillo also
worked to ensure that he had almost absolute control over the Dominican economy. He owned a
majority of many industries profitable to the state; when it became too expensive to run, he
would sell it to the state, and then buy it back at a low price when it again became profitable
(Gleijeses, 1978). This shows how he was connected to the government—while it could function
without him, he utilized it as a tool to further his family and himself.
Trujillo’s economic influence extends beyond his own finances and controlling the
Dominican economy. In August of 1960, the Organization of American States imposed sanctions
on the Dominican Republic, citing Trujillo’s repeated violations of human rights and his
repressive rule as a dictator. As Latin America democratized and various leaders positioned
themselves against Trujillo, the state became known as the “pariah of the hemisphere” and faced
a bleak economic future. It was these sanctions that Ramfis and Balaguer hoped to lift by
democratizing the nation and welcoming opposition. Overall, some of the effects we expected to
see—namely, the power vacuum following the death of an autocratic dictator—were not present
despite the lack of democratic characteristics; however, the effect of the characteristic was
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present. This shows that institutional form may influence the resulting instability, but does not
guarantee a single outcome.
CASE STUDY 3: PANAMA, JOSÉ ANTONIO “CHICHI” REMÓN
José Antonio Remón, the president of Panama from 1952 to 1955, was known as the
“maker of presidents” in Panama before running himself. He’s also proved himself to be the one
who removes them. 18 months after his installation following an unfair election, President
Arnulfo Arias was impeached and forcibly removed by Remón after suspending the constitution
to extend his term and dissolving the National Assembly. Remón then ran for the presidency in
the next election and won. He was gunned down at a Panamanian racetrack January 2, 1955, and
his vice president was quickly implicated in the assassination plot.
Panama in 1955 is listed as an anocracy in this case study. While listed in Geddes’ (2014)
database as a personalist dictatorship, the polity score for Panama is -1 (Marshall et al. 2014),
thus defining it under my definition as an anocracy. This is further supported by readings on
Panamanian government at the time—while the National Assembly was an elected body and the
president was still an elected position, Remón clearly had a great influence on the body. As
Panama is considered an anocracy, the effects of an assassination will depend on which aspects
of government and culture reflect the government’s leanings toward democracy or autocracy. For
example, Panama has an order of succession, which would lead to an expectation that instability
would not increase greatly following an assassination. However, the state also lacked solid
separation of powers, which can decrease stability in a regime. Based on Panama’s leaning
toward autocratic characteristics, as well as pre-existing conditions and other events stemming
from the assassination—such as Remón’s successor being convicted within two weeks of his
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death and a bad economic situation in the country—instability in Panama would be expected to
increase.
Political Instability
The first characteristic discussed is the order of succession. This certainly existed in
Panama: should the president die, he had two vice presidents to follow, and then ministers in the
government would begin filling the office. Much of the uncertainty was not who was next, but
rather when they would take office. With the death of Remón, the influencer behind the scenes
was removed from the equation. This was shown in how, following Remón’s death in 1955, his
First Vice President Guizado was constitutionally impeached and removed from power before
being tried, and the second Vice President remained for the remainder of the term, followed by
two presidents who remained in office for their full term (Goemans et al., 2009). This newfound
certainty increased stability in the state following Remón’s assassination.
There was an additional factor to look at relating to the leaders coming and going from
office. During Remón’s time as chief of the National Police, elections were being held, though
they were not always entirely fair and, in one case, actually annulled. This falls more under the
category of election fraud; however, this is still an increase in instability in the nation.
The next characteristic discussed is the norms surrounding this order of succession.
While having this order of succession helped prevent instability by ensuring that someone was in
line to take over, the norms surrounding this order of succession were a far cry from those in
democratic states. Remón had been known as the “maker of presidents” before he ran in 1953
(Geddes et al., 2014). This title is reflected in his controlling of the presidential election in 1948,
when he denied the winner of an election the presidency, This lack of recognition for the popular
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vote meant that, following Remón’s assassination, Panamanian citizens had no guarantee that the
order of succession—though codified in law—would be followed.
Additionally, by the late 1940s, political activist groups had begun to arise, primarily in
the university students. Indeed, students had “[taken] political deliberation out of the National
Assembly and [thrust] it into the streets through boisterous and, occasionally, violent protests”
(Harding, 2006, 47). It had been shown before that violent protest could unseat a leader, so the
norms surrounding this did not guarantee that, even if the National Assembly enforced the order
of succession, that the citizens would accept it. While following Remón’s death, there were few
violent protests, there was still the possibility hanging over the nation that violence could break
out at any time. This was further exacerbated by Guizado’s impeachment, thus increasing
political instability.
The final characteristic discussed is the separation of powers. Following Remón’s
assassination, the National Assembly seemed to regain much of the power that once rested in he
dictator’s hands, thus bolstering the separation of powers that should have existed in Panama.
Presidents were no longer removed at the whim of a singular person. However, as mentioned
above, the norms surrounding the National Assembly’s powers to enforce the order of succession
were weak, thus undermining this reclamation and putting it more in line with the expectations
for an autocratic. The power to remove presidents rested partially with the people, rather than
with the elected body that should have that power. This is a strange in-between: while the people
have the power to remove the president in democracies, the people in Panama held this power
directly, and often utilized it through violence in tandem with a non-political removal. It’s this
mixing of democratic and autocratic tendencies that makes Panama an anocracy, and thus
influences how the nation experiences instability.
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Social Instability
The first characteristic discussed is the order of succession. While there was a codified
order of succession, it was weakly enforced prior to Remón’s death, negating a majority of the
good influence it had in the United States. This gave Panama little uncertainty about its future, at
the hands of a dictator. However, this does not necessarily translate into a rise in social instability
after Remón’s assassination: while people would be living in constant fear of this violence, the
threat of violence has fewer physical impacts, thus resulting in a smaller increase in instability,
though an increase all the same.
Perhaps the biggest issue is not Remón’s assassination, but the fact that the vice
president—who would inherit the position—was originally implicated in the crime. This gives
the look of extreme corruption within the government, to the point where politicians are quite
literally gunning for each other. This appearance of corruption also draws from the norms
surrounding the order, and as a result weakens trust in the government and leaves people with
weaker channels to address grievances.
The next characteristic discussed is the norms surrounding democracy. These tie, again,
back to the uncertainty surrounding the order of succession itself. The lack of enforcement and,
by extension, trust in the order meant that, should the general public decide that they did not
want a president, it was not unreasonable that they would resort to violence. This led to
uncertainty for many citizens, as violence was a possibility at any time following Remón’s
assassination.
Yet the threat of violence, as mentioned above, is not actually violence. Panama
technically had the channels for citizens to air grievances; with Remón and the constant cycle of
presidents, however, it gave precedent to the idea that unwanted policies or presidents could be
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removed if the public caused enough of an uproar, and even more so if some sort of violence was
threatened. The pathways were utilized as a way to threaten the country with violence, rather
than as a way to air grievances peacefully. While actual violence has more serious outcomes than
the mere threat, this threat still results in a lower quality of life, thus increasing instability less
than an actual violent outcome would. In Panama, violence never occurred broadly, thus leaving
this increase in instability a smaller and temporary spike.
The final characteristic discussed is the separation of powers. As was mentioned above,
protestors had learned that political action, especially violent action, could obtain results from
the National Assembly. However, following Remón’s assassination, the National Assembly
seemed to regain some of this power, and seeing that their elected officials were once again in
charge of policy—an aspect of corruption eliminated from the state—lowers instability.
Additionally, the fact that Remón was no longer controlling both elections and the removal of
presidents meant that elections and those put in power by this had control of these changes in
office once again, rather than a single figure who was not, at least originally, elected.
Economic Instability
Much economic strife existed in Panama before José Remón’s presidency. As an
industrializing country, a large portion of Panama’s population was moving from rural areas into
the two major cities, Panama City and Colón, which stressed those cities and lead to high
unemployment rates, high poverty, and an overall economic downturn for the nation (Maurer and
Yu, 2011). The lack of revenue from the Panama Canal and the United States’ rentals for
military bases was little help to the struggling economy. Contributing these issues to his
presidency or even his influence is a difficult assumption to make with this history.
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During his short time as Panama’s president, Remón travelled to the U.S. and negotiated
a new treaty regarding the Panama Canal with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This new deal
seemed to lean much more toward helping Panama, as it updated the treaty annuity from
$430,000—the rate since the last increase in three decades—to $1.93 million and allowed the
Panamanian government to tax Panamanian citizens who worked in the canal zone and
guaranteed them equal pay (Maurer and Yu, 2011). They additionally received property worth
$44 million. While not ideal for either nation, the deal certainly pushed Panama forward
economically. However, Remón had few others economic effects on the nation, and the
assassination simply contributed to the ever-revolving presidential office of Panama. Thus, we
see what would be expected in Panama—a lack of democratic characteristics and norms caused
expectations to lean towards autocratic expectations, but the few democratic characteristics that
did exist prevented some instability.
CONCLUSION
In the course of this research, various things have become clear. The overall finding is
that the type of institution—or, more accurately, the presence of democratic characteristics—can
influence how a state’s instability changes following an assassination. The Dominican Republic,
however, adds a key caveat: it is not necessarily the characteristic itself, but the effect of the
characteristic that is important. Despite not having a codified order of succession, the power
vacuum in the Dominican Republic was closed within hours of Trujillo’s death, mitigating that
instability. This is what also makes the Dominican Republic more of an outlier, possibly, than a
representative case. However, other factors can also alter the outcome of an assassination and
allow instability to rise, as was seen in Panama: while the order of succession existed, the weak
norms surrounding it caused a decrease in stability, in a sense “cancelling out” the order of
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succession’s effect. Thus, although the presence of democratic characteristics will likely predict
the outcome, it is not a guarantee of what will happen following an assassination; institutional
features structure interactions, but they are not ultimately determinative of their outcomes.
While I have answered my main query, many more questions have developed that require
further study and can help to further explain how assassinations can affect instability within a
state. A key one is that, although this study shows that regime type influences how assassination
affects instability, there is considerable variation within regimes in multiple senses. For example,
within autocratic institutions, there are personalist regimes, military dictatorships, monarchies,
and one-party rule. While a personalist regime might see a power vacuum and major instability
following an assassination, an institution like a monarchy or a one-party system likely have some
sort of order of succession, whether it follows a bloodline or involves a hand-picked successor.
Thus, certain types of governments would see less stability because they utilize features that are
commonly associated with democracy.
On the other hand, other variations may involve how a state reacts to an assassination. In
a personalist regime, for example, we would expect to see increased instability in the state due to
a power vacuum opening and various figures fighting to fill the vacated role. However, as was
seen here, the Dominican Republic closed the power vacuum within hours because they were
alerted quickly and had someone with a clear claim to the role. A quick response time prevented
a lot of instability that was expected in the state.
Additionally, a major factor may be the length of time the institution has been in power.
Trujillo had 31 years to cement his place as the ruler of the Dominican Republic; a leader who
had only five years would not have the same interest as Trujillo did without incredibly brutal
tactics, and even then there’s no guarantee that—in a short time frame—this would not lead to
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resentment among the population and, thus, some unrest among the citizenry. On the flipside, a
monarchy that had been in power for generations and has continually failed to raise the standard
of living could also hold less sway than a leader who had a term stretching for little more than a
generation. The length of time of a regime could have implications for how an assassination
would affect instability within a nation.
Another question that has seen research in the last decade is the effect that coups can
have on nation instability. Assassinations with no coup attached are rare, especially in
autocracies where an assassination could mean a large shift in leadership—while a democracy
provides an order of succession, not all autocratic regimes will provide such a thing, thus leaving
more to gain, in a sense, from an assassination. However, it could be possible that a coup
attached to an assassination would cause less instability with a figure ready to step in and fill the
role already present before the assassination; the power vacuum has no chance to occur and thus
prevents some instability.
A question connected to this is whether a string of assassinations would increase
instability, building off each other and leaving a country more and more unstable with each
successive plot. It’s possible that, if a leader does not have time in office to enact any changes in
policy, the country falls behind and struggles to maintain any growth.
A final new question is whether the political standing of the assassinated person holds
any influence over the instability from the assassination. Did the JFK assassination and the MLK
assassination have similar effects in the U.S.? Did Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination, of a civil
rights leader, lead to similar results as that of Indira Gandhi, the country’s prime minister? Do
assassinations of terrorist or rebel leaders have any effect on the group’s continued existence or
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the strength of the organization? Overall, does a head of state hold the same level of influence in
the event of an assassination as a high-ranking politician or political figure?
Finally, a vital effect would very possibly come to light if assassinations became tools of
foreign policy again: are large nations, such as those leading the western world, prepared for the
possibility of assassins again targeting their leaders? When assassination first began falling out
of use, security was—by today’s standard—primitive. In an age of remote security and camera
surveillance, getting close to a leader would be much more difficult, partially mitigating this risk.
On the other hand, advances in technology have also made getting closer easier, as was seen in
the commercial drone attacks on Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro in 2018. However, that
doesn’t completely negate the risk. Thus, it must be asked whether the benefits of assassination
outweigh both its side effects, studied here, as well as the possibility of a target going on the
nation’s own leader or a high-ranking official.
Assassinations have been sworn off by large nations for centuries as a dishonorable and
underhanded tactic. However, their use over the centuries by rebel groups and terrorist
organizations as tools kept assassination in everyone’s minds. In addition to the changing nature
of warfare in modern times from large armies to smaller elite units, this means that assassinations
as a general tactic may return to prominence within the future. Understanding how assassinations
affect states and their stability in the political, social, and economic spheres is vital before
attempting any sort of plan; knowing these effects makes for a better plan, and thus makes for a
better future.
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